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Article
Sales Tax and Use Tax: Historical Developments and
Differing Features
Herman C. McCloud*
State sales taxation came into vogue in the United States during
the Depression.' Faced with a sharp decline in revenue and increasing pressure on the property tax, states were forced to turn to
new sources of revenue to meet the challenges of their expanding
role and increased expenditures.2 Thus, in 1930 only two states lev-

ied sales taxes, by 1933 the number had grown to fifteen, and by
1976, forty-four states and the District of Columbia imposed sales
and use taxes which have become the most significant source of
* B.A., 1942, Allegheny College; LL.B., 1950, Duquesne University; member, Pennsylvania bar. The author is the former Manager of the Sales and Use Tax division for the
United States Steel Corporation. The writer acknowledges with appreciation the assistance
of G.H. Danvers, a fourth year evening law student at the Duquesne University School of
Law, in the preparation of this article.
1. For a general discussion of the development of state sales and use tax law, see Studenski, Characteristics,Developments and Present Status of Consumption Taxes, 8 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROS. 417 (1941); Pierce, The Place of Consumers' Excises in the Tax System, 8
LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 430 (1941); Due, The Nature and Structure of Sales Taxation, 9
VAND. L. REv. 123 (1956).
2. Facing equal pressure, Congress considered a federal sales tax on manufacturers in
the 1931-32 session, but subsequently defeated the bill and modified it to include excise
taxes on certain selected commodities only such as lubricating oils, malt, furs, jewelry, sporting goods, automobiles, admissions and gasoline. Many of these provisions survive today.
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4503 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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state revenue. s
The expression "sales tax" or "consumption tax" includes within
its scope a wide variation of levies according to the activity or
transaction taxed.4 Although termed "bewilderingly various" by
one commentator, 5 a general observation concerning the sales tax
can be made, particularly to distinguish the use tax. Broadly
speaking, sales taxes are considered to be those imposed upon the
sale of tangible personal property at either the retail or wholesale
level and on certain services within the state.6 Legislators recognized the political benefit of adopting new sales taxes rather than
raising rates of existing taxes or imposing individual income taxes.
Advantages of the sales tax alternative include: (1) relief to property owners from tax rate increases; (2) imposition on the general
populace at a uniform, low rate; (3) minimizing impact by application to each purchase; (4) avoiding criticism of regressiveness by
allowing exemptions for food and clothing; (5) facilitating collection procedures by requiring retailers to collect and remit the tax.
Since it was thought that sales taxes could constitutionally reach
only those transactions or sales within the state, the perceived loss
of revenue due to out-of-state purchasing was remedied by the passage of use taxes.7 Generally, use taxes are normally those imposed
upon the use, storage or consumption of tangible personal property
not subject to state sales tax; most importantly, property purchased outside the state.
Neither the sales tax nor the use tax are considered to be property taxes. Rather, they are construed to be taxes on the privileges
of selling, buying, ownership, possession or use.' While a sales and
use tax are intended to be complementary and are usually embodied in one statute, there are significant differences between them
with respect to exemptions,9 time of payment, 10 and application of
3.

Those states having no sales or use taxes although some have local sales taxes are

Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Montana, New Hampshire and Oregon. In 1976, general sales, use
and gross receipts taxes provided 30.6 percent of the total state tax collections, while individual and corporate income taxes yielded 32.1 percent. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 2-6 (4th ed. 1978).
4. Sales taxes have been grouped into various categories. See, e.g., HAIG & SHOUP, THE
SALES TAX IN AMEmCAN STATES 3-4 (1934).
5. Northrup, The Measure of Sales Taxes, 9 VAND. L. Rav. 237, 238 (1956).
6. One early commentator noted five distinguishing characteristics of the sales tax. See
Studenski, supra note 1, at 419.
7. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 27-46 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 5741.02(c)(4) (Page 1982) which exempts from use
tax property purchased from outside of the state which is temporarily stored within the
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constitutional provisions."1 The two taxes must be equal as to application of rate and basis of measurement."' In other words, the
tax burden borne by the local merchant or customer can be no less
than the burden borne by the out-of-state merchant, or purchaser
of foreign goods.
This article is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the
law of state sales and use tax. Rather, the author focuses on the
historical development of principles and distinctions between sales
taxes and use taxes. After consideration of constitutional issues involved, the article brings forth some recent problems in the areas
of interstate sellers, government contractors, major service providers and manufacturer-users.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Sales Taxes
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution provides
that Congress shall have the power "to regulate commerce . ..
among the several states."13 Consequently, no state was permitted
to tax interstate commerce, and with several exceptions,1 4 interstate sales enjoyed considerable immunity from state sales taxes.15
state for subsequent use outside of the state. No such temporary storage exemption exists
for sales tax.
. 10. In the case of sales tax, the tax is paid at the time of the purchase to the vendor.
See, e.g., Omo Rzv. CODE ANN. § 5739.12 (Page 1982). In the case of use taxes, the tax may
be returned after the purchase in the taxpayer's return. See, e.g., Omio Rzv. CODE ANN. §
5741.12 (Page 1982).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 13-95.
12. See infra notes 49-78 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cL 3.
14. See, e.g., Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935) (no immunity from
sales tax where contract does not require or contemplate shipment in interstate commerce);
Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390 (1930) (parties cannot contract
place of passage of title so as to avoid local sales tax); Banker Bros. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 222
U.S. 210 (1911) (sale of automobile wholly intrastate was held subject to sales tax despite
the fact that the goods were manufactured in another state and purchaser obtained warranty from manufacturer and paid freight from place of manufacture). See generally, Lockhart, Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce, 52 HARv. L. Rav. 617 (1939).
15. This immunity was thought to derive from the broad rule of Robbins v. Shelby
County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887) in which the Court stated:
Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax
should be laid on domestic commerce.... The negotiations of sales of goods which
are in another state, for the purpose of introducing them into the state in which the
negotiation is made, is interstate commerce.
Id. at 497. Robbins struck down as an obstacle to interstate commerce the state "drummer"
taxes which imposed licenses upon itinerant salesmen of goods shipped through interstate
commerce as a condition precedent to soliciting in the state. The broad holding of Robbins
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In 1940, however, a sharply divided Court in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.' upheld a New York sales tax measured by the gross receipts of an interstate sale on the grounds
that the tax did not discriminate against interstate commerce and
that interstate commerce should "bear its fair share of the state
tax burden."'" The sales tax challenged was adopted by New York

City and imposed a tax on purchases for consumption of tangible
personal property at the rate of two percent on the amount of the
receipts from every sale in the city,18 to be paid by the purchaser
to the seller. 9 In Berwind-White, contracts for the sale of coal
were made in New York but delivery was made directly to the customer in New York from the mines in Pennsylvania. The respondent argued that the "interstate character of the transaction [was]
the essence of it''ao and the sales tax thus discriminated against
interstate commerce. The Court, however, rejected this interpretation on the ground that the taxable event was the transfer of possession to the purchaser within the state.2 ' Noting that "equality is
the theme, 2 Justice Stone, writing for the majority, found no advantage to intrastate commerce under the sales tax which "laid
upon every purchaser, within the state

. .

regardless of whether

[the goods for consumption] have been transported in interstate
commerce."23 In dissent, Chief Justice Hughes attacked the majority opinion as opening the door for multiple tax burdens on inter24
state commerce.

was subsequently narrowed by the Court to fixed-sum licenses levied on the business of
soliciting orders for the purchase of goods in interstate commerce. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 57 (1940).
16. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
17. Id. at 49.
18. Id. at 42-43. Under the statute, sale was defined as "any transfer of title or possession, or both . . . in any manner or by any means whatsoever for a consideration or any
agreement therefor." Id.
19. Id. at 43. The Court noted that the ultimate burden was on the buyer while the
duty for collection and payment to the city rested with the seller. Id. at 43-44.
20. Id. at 39.
21. Id. at 49.
22. Id. at 48. Among those taxes cited by Justice Stone as unconstitutional obstacles
to interstate commerce were levies which "aimed at or discrimate against the commerce or
impose a levy for the privilege of doing it, or tax interstate transportation or communication
or their gross earnings, or levy an exaction on merchandise in the course of its interstate
journey." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 68-69 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting). In this case, the Chief Justice noted that

"[ijf New York can tax the delivery, Pennsylvania can tax the shipment and New Jersey the
transshipment," Id. at 69 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting). Apportionment of the burden, however,
might eliminate the burden of multiple taxation. Id.
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Under the doctrine of Berwind-White and its companion cases, 5
the immunity of goods flowing in interstate commerce from state
sales tax was extremely narrowed, and the taxing power of the
states expanded. Interstate commerce was now required to bear its
fair share of the cost of local government whose protection it enjoyed. The broad rule of equality emerged: so long as interstate
commerce was not placed at a competitive disadvantage to local
business by virtue of the tax, it was subject to the taxing power of
the state. Application of this principle to particular factual situations, however, has produced a host of varying decisions due
largely to the interstate character of the transaction involved.26
B.

Use Tax Legislation

A levy on the use, storage, or consumption of personal property
within a state enables the taxing authority to reach, as a source of
revenue, extra-territorial sales otherwise immune under the Constitution.27 Additionally, use or compensation taxes protect local
retailers from loss of business to foreign merchants.2 8 As early as
1868, the Court recognized these principles of compensating taxation.29 Unlike the varied application of the interstate commerce
25. On the same day that the Court decided Berwind-White, it also denied two other
challenges to the New York City sales tax. See McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309
U.S. 70 (1940), and McGoldrick v. A.H. DuGrenier, Inc., 309 U.S. 70 (1940). In contrast to
Berwind-White, the contracts for sale in these cases were made outside of New York. On
the authority of Berwind-White, however, the Court sustained the imposition of sales tax to
these transactions as well.
26. See, e.g., Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc. v. Alabama, 393 U.S. 537 (1969) (five dollar
per week tax on transient out-of-state photographers not disproportionate to tax imposed
on local photographers); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327 (1944) (where title passed in
the state of manufacture upon delivery of goods to carrier, state to which goods shipped for
delivery to purchaser could not exact sales tax); Eastern Air Transp. Inc. v. South Carolina
Tax Comm'n, 285 U.S. 147 (1932) (mere purchase of supplies of equipment for use in conducting interstate commerce is not so identified with that commerce as to make the sale
immune).
27. The commerce clause and the due process clause limit the ability of states to tax
sales not within their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340
(1954); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
28. See, e.g., Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. v. Gerosa, 16 N.Y.2d 1, 209 N.E.2d 86, 261
N.Y.S.2d 32 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 368 (1966). See generally, Hartman, Sales Taxation in Interstate Commerce, 9 VAND. L. Rav. 138, 164-65 (1956).
29. See Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148 (1868). In Hinson, Alabama levied a tax
on liquor brought into the state for sale, but did not levy against local liquors. The Court
held that such legislation, making the tax equal on all liquors sold in the state regardless of
whether manufactured within the state or imported, was not discriminatory against the
products of the other states and therefore did not violate the commerce clause. Id.
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clause to state sales taxation,3 0 there is more consistency in the
constitutional analysis of state and local use tax schemes.
The validity of use taxes levied on articles used in interstate
commerce was first challenged in Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky."1 A three cent per gallon tax was levied by Kentucky on all
gasoline sold or used within the state.3" The taxpayer, a citizen of
Illinois, was engaged in the exclusive interstate business of operating a ferry boat between Illinois and Kentucky and purchased all
of the gasoline for his business in Illinois.s The Court struck down
the tax as a direct burden on interstate commerce3 4 and denied the
states the power to tax articles, supplies, or equipment which was
actually used in interstate commerce.
Although Helson immunized the use of articles within the
stream of commerce from use taxation, nevertheless, once the articles come to rest, they shed their interstate character and are subject to use taxation.3 5 Consequently, the issue becomes what constitutes taxable use within the state. 6
30. See supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
31. 279 U.S. 245 (1929).
32. Id. at 247-48.
33. Id. at 248. It was stipulated that 75 percent of the gasoline was consumed in Kentucky. Id.
34. Id. at 252. The Court stated:
The tax is exacted as the price of the privilege of using an instrumentality of interstate commerce .... A tax, which falls directly upon the use of one of the means by
which commerce is carried on, directly burdens that commerce. If a tax cannot be laid
by a state upon the interstate transportation of the subjects of commerce, as this
Court definitely has held, it is little more than repetition to say that such a tax cannot be laid upon the use of a medium by which such transportation is effected.
Id.
35. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973) (storage and withdrawal of aviation fuel consumed in interstate flights was a taxable use). Southern Pacific
Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939) (upholding tax on storage and use of railroad equipment purchased outside the state and brought into the state for use in the operation of an
interstate railroad); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939)(retention and
installation of equipment purchased outside and brought into state for operation of business
is right of ownership which is subject to use tax); Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288
U.S. 249 (1933) (tax on storage and withdrawal of gasoline for use in interstate railroad
upheld). See Hartman, supra note 28, at 159-64.
36. State use tax statutes vary in their definitions of "use." See, e.g., N.Y. TAx LAW §
1101(7) (McKinney 1975) which provides:
(7) Use. The exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property by the
purchaser thereof and includes, but is not limited to, the receiving, storage or any
keeping or retention for any length of time, withdrawal from storage, any installation,
any affixation to real or personal property, or any consumption of such property.
Id. 72 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7201(o)(1) (Purdon's Supp. 1983) which provides: "(1) The
exercise of any right or power incidental to the ownership, custody or possession of tangible
personal property and shall include, but not be limited to transportation, storage or con-
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The Supreme Court considered this issue in Henneford v. Silas
Mason Co.,37 where the State of Washington levied a use tax on
the privilege of using tangible personal property within the state,
at the rate of two percent of the purchase price-" The taxpayer
was engaged in the construction of the Grand Coulee Dam and
brought into Washington machinery, materials and supplies purchased at retail in other states for use in the construction." The
company protested the use tax on the grounds that it violated the
commerce clause. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling that the tax was unconstitutional, reasoning
that the tax was not upon the operations of interstate commerce
but upon the privilege of use after commerce had ended. 4 Further,
the tax upon the use after the property came to rest in Washington
did not discriminate against interstate commerce."' Although the
subjects of the tax encompassed only articles purchased out of
state or in interstate commerce, the Court was unpersuaded that it

burdened interstate commerce. Rather, the sales and compensating
use tax scheme equally burdened all owners, whether by virtue of
sumption." Id. Tix. TAx CODs ANN. § 151.011 (Vernon 1982) which provides:
(a) Except as provided by Subsections (b) and (e) of this section, "use" means the
exercise of a right or power incidental to the ownership of tangible personal property
over tangible personal property and. . .includes the incorporation of tangible personal property into real estate or into improvements of real estate whether or not the
real estate is subsequently sold.
(b) "Use" does not include the sale of tangible personal property in the regular
course of business or the transfer of tangible personal property as an integral part of
a taxable service performed in the regular course of business.
(c) Except as provided by Subsections (d) and (e) of this section, "storage" means
the keeping or retaining for any purpose in this state of tangible personal property
sold by a retailer.
(d) "Storage" does not include the keeping or retaining of tangible personal property for sale in the regular course of business
(e) Neither "use" nor "storage" includes the exercise of a right or power over, or
the keeping or retaining of, tangible personal property for the purpose of:
(1) transporting the property outside the state for use solely outside the
state; or
(2) processing, fabricating, or manufacturing the property into other property or attaching the property to or incorporating the property into other property to be transported outside the state for use solely outside the state.
Id.
37. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
38. Id. at 580. Included in the price was the cost of transportation from the place
where the article was purchased. Id. Among the exclusions from imposition of the tax were
property not purchased at retail and the use of property the sale or use of which had already been subject to a tax by another state. Id. at 580-81.
39. Id. at 579.
40. Id. at 582.
41. Id. at 583.
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the sales tax on local activity or the tax on the privilege of use of
property purchased outside the state." Since goods acquired
through interstate commerce may be subject to property tax once
they become part of the "common mass of property within the
state of destination," 3 under similar reasoning they may be subject to a tax on their use or enjoyment once they are at rest within
the taxing authority." In this case, the machinery and equipment
were no longer within the stream of commerce but had come to
rest within the state. The definition of use under the Washington
statute instructed that:
Property is put to use by the first act after delivery is completed within the
state by which the article purchased is actually used or is made available for
use with intent actually to use the same within the state. . . and includes
the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property preparatory to actual use. . . such as keeping, storing, withdrawing from storage,
moving, installing or performing any act by which dominion or control over
4
the property is assumed by the purchaser. "

By definition, items or articles in interstate commerce were excluded from use taxation and only when the goods became part of
the "common mass of property within the state of destination"
could they become the proper subjects of taxation. This definition
of use, according to the Supreme Court, is wholly acceptable
4
within the commerce clause requirements. 6
While absolute equality of treatment between local merchants
and interstate commerce is probably impossible, discriminatory
treatment is certainly unconstitutional. Although Henneford approved a sales and use tax scheme which imposed a uniform tax
burden on all tangible personal property used or consumed within
a state, merely applying one uniform rate to sales within the state
and use of property acquired without the state may not achieve the
42. Id. at 584. Justice Cardozo, in his well-known poetic style, noted that "the stranger
from afar is subject to no greater burden than the dweller within the gates." Id.
43. Id. at 582.
44. Id. The Court noted that a tax on the privilege of use or storage when the chattel
had ceased to be in transit "is now an impost so common that its validity has been withdrawn from the arena of debate." Id. at 583.
45. Id.
46. Id. Henneford is credited with obviating the necessity for legislation sought by the
Association of State Tax Administrators in the 73rd through the 76th Congress to permit
states to extend their sales taxes to certain interstate transactions. See H.R. REP. No. 565,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 613-15 (1965).
47. See Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 432 (1946). See also Warren &
Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays Its Way, 38 COLUM. L. Rv.
49, 70-74 (1938).
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desired equality of burden. Consequently, courts have focused on
the entire sales and use tax legislative scheme in order to determine whether in practical effect, interstate commerce is burdened
48
to the advantage of the local merchant.
The issue of equality between sales and use tax applications, in
the face of a uniform rate, was before the Court in Halliburton Oil
Well Cementing Co. v. Reily. 4s Under its legislation, Louisiana
taxed sales within the state at the rate of two percent of the retail
sales price and imposed a use tax at the rate of two percent of the
cost price on property used but not sold in the state. 50 The taxpayer was an oil well driller and servicer who manufactured specialized equipment for its own use at its Oklahoma location and
permanently brought such equipment into Louisiana to drill and
service oil wells. It paid use taxes on the value of the raw materials
and other articles used in the manufacture of the equipment, but
did not include the value of labor and shop overhead attributable
to such items." The use tax was levied on the full computed value
of the assembled equipment, including the labor and shop overhead costs, although the state admitted that such costs would not
be included in the levies against in-state manufacturers whose
52
sales taxes were limited to the purchase price of materials only.
While the trial court found the assessment discriminatory, the
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the tax, characterizing the discrepancy in application of the sales and use taxes as "incidental.""
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court found such application to discriminate against interstate commerce to the advantage
of the local merchant.54 Since local manufacturer-users would not
be subject to sales or use tax on the labor and shop overhead, the
48. See, e.g., Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952);
Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932).
49. 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
50. Id. at 65-66. The use tax was to be reduced by the amounts of any similar tax paid
in another state. Id. at 66.
51. Id. at 66-67.
52. Id. at 67. It was stipulated that:
If Halliburton had purchased its materials, operated its shops, and incurred its Labor
and Shop Overhead expenses at a location within the State of Louisiana, there would
have been a sales tax due to the State of Louisiana upon the cost of materials purchased in Louisiana and a Use Tax on materials purchased outside of Louisiana; but
there would have been no Louisiana sales tax or use tax due upon the Labor and
Shop Overhead.

Id.
53.
54.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 73.
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burden was unequal, favoring the local manufacturer-user and encouraging the foreign merchant to locate within Louisiana. "5 Noting that "equal treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers
similarly situated is the condition precedent for a valid use tax on
goods imported from out-of-state "' 6 and that dollars and cents and
not legal abstractions is the measure of equality, the Court calculated that the disparity in treatment in this case amounted to
$1,547,109.70. 57 The inclusion of labor and shop overhead in the
cost price of the items taxed resulted in a heavier burden on the
foreign manufacturer-user which was hardly incidental.58 In concurring, Justice Brennan indicated that Louisiana, or any other
state, could legislatively provide for a tax on the full value of use,
but only if it were equal to the sales tax applied to similar value.59
A further interesting facet of Halliburton concerned a ruling of
equality between sales tax and use tax transactions, but on rather
unusual facts. Halliburton had purchased, for use in Louisiana, an
airplane from a New York manufacturing company and some cementing service units from a Texas drilling company, neither of
which company was engaged in the business of selling such items. 60
The Louisiana sales tax statute exempted isolated sales of articles
within the state by persons not regularly engaged in the business
of selling such articles."1 The Court struck down the assessments
against these items, briefly stating that such a determination was
also a discriminatory violation of the commerce clause since the
practical effect of the tax was to favor the local second-hand
62

market.

Disparity among sales and use tax legislation also exists at the
local level of government. For example, an Ohio sales and use tax
statute authorized individual counties to levy one-half percent
sales and use taxes on property purchased or used within their
boundaries," in addition to a state sales and use tax levied at the
55. Id. at 72.
56. Id. at 70.
57. Id. at 70-71.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 77 (Brennan, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 67-68. No Louisiana use tax was declared or paid by Halliburton on these
items. Had these acquisitions been made within the state, they would not have been subject
to tax. Id. at 68.
61. Id. The use tax contained no equivalent exemption for isolated sales of secondhand articles. Id.
62. Id. at 73-74.
63. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5739.021 (Page 1980).
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rate of four percent." Exemptions from state taxes also applied to
the county taxes.6s Although intended to achieve uniformity among
sales and use tax assessments at the local level, the statute did not
succeed. Thus, in a taxing county, items used there but purchased
in another Ohio county without the tax were not subject to the
local tax since property purchased in Ohio was exempt from state
use tax.66 In contrast, items purchased outside Ohio and used in
the taxing county were subject to the county use tax. This taxing
scheme was invalidated on constitutional grounds by the Ohio Supreme Court in American Modulars Corp. v. Lindley.17 In examining the effect of the tax on interstate commerce,68 the court found
that the statute provided a "direct commercial advantage to local
purchases" and invidiously discriminated against out-of-state acquisitions.69 Although the statute appeared on its face to provide a
uniform burden, similarly used property in a taxing county was
taxed at different rates according to its origin of purchase, unconstitutionally impeding the free flow of commerce between the
states. 0
While American Modulars required equality of treatment between in-state and out-of-state acquisitions in a taxing county, a
further problem remained with respect to tax treatment of purely
in-state acquisitions. A purchase in a county adopting the tax for
shipment into a nontaxing county is taxable under the state sales
tax and the county tax. However, goods sold in a nontaxing county
but used or consumed in a taxing county are subject only to the
state sales tax, since the state use tax exempts property purchased
in-state. Whether the interstate commerce clause applies to this
purely in-state situation is doubtful. "Local" merchants in a
nontaxing county, however, are surely favored by their local governments to the disadvantage of "foreign" merchants in another
county adopting the tax. Possible grounds for such a protest might
include denial of due process and violation of the equal protection
64. Id. at §§ 5741.02 and 5739.02. The Ohio State sales and use tax has been amended
to provide for a taxing rate of five percent. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.025 (Page Supp.

1984).
65.
66.

Id. at § 5739.021(C).
Id. at § 5741.02(C)(1).

67. 54 Ohio St. 2d 273, 376 N.E.2d 575, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 911 (1978).
68. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
69. 54 Ohio St. 2d at 278, 376 N.E.2d at 577. The court relied on Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940), for the principle that such discrimination is unconstitutional even
if it occurs merely in practical operation.
70. 54 Ohio St. 2d at 278, 376 N.E.2d at 578.

834

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 22:823

clause.7
A similar situation occurred under a Texas statute which permitted cities to tax sales according to the shipping location of the
Texas vendor.72 Shipments from outside Texas into cities adopting
the tax were subject to the city use tax.73 However, shipments from
in-state nontaxing cities into cities assessing the sales and use tax
were exempt. Faced with a constitutional challenge to their taxing
scheme74 similar to that in American Modulars," the Texas legislature subsequently remedied the problem, authorizing cities imposing the tax to assess use tax on articles purchased in nontaxing
6
cities.
Adoption of the use tax by states to achieve economic equality
between sales within its state and out-of-state sales, particularly
where the state is bordered by other states with no sales tax on the
item or a lower tax, is a valid exercise of state power so long as the
burden borne by each owner is relatively equal. Such "protective
tariffs" however will not be sustained if the state discriminates between products of its state and the products of sister states. Thus,
a provision in a sales and use tax scheme exempting trade-in al71. Such intrastate discrimination was upheld in Spatt v. City of New York, 14 A.D.2d
30, 218 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1961), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 618, 191 N.E.2d 91 (1963), appeal dismissed,
375 U.S. 394 (1964). In Spatt, a New York City use tax measured by the full purchase price,
including trade-in, on an automobile purchased by a resident in a nontaxing city was sustained despite exclusion of the trade-in allowance in computing the base of the city sales tax
on automobiles purchased within the city. The court determined that a reasonable basis
existed for the distinction between sales and use taxes. See Note, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 307
(1962).
The Texas city sales and use tax has other aspects which may be violative of due process
but for which the question has never been raised. One questionable provision involves the
direct payment procedure which permits the purchaser to accrue the tax and pay it directly
to the taxing authority rather than to the vendor. Tax. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.417 (Vernon
1982). Such a procedure is particularly useful to a consumer whose purchases could either
be taxable or nontaxable depending on their use. However, applicants for Direct Pay Permits must show $800,000 in annual purchases which appears to discriminate against lower
volume purchases. Id. at § 151.419(b)(3) (Vernon 1984). Another questionable provision provides that direct payment permittees pay self-declared use but not sales tax. Id. at § 151.419
(b)(1). Obviously these discriminatory provisions result in substantial dollar benefits to
companies which have manufacturing facilities in "industrial areas" not within city boundaries. Of course, the beneficiaries will not complain even though it is probable that many
have facilities both within and without cities having the tax, so it is a matter of "take what
you can get."
72. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 20.01-20.17 (Vernon 1969).
73. Id. at art. 20.03.
74. United States Steel Corp. v. Bullock (District Court of Travis County, Tex. No.
282,395, 261st Dist. 1981).
75. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
76. T x. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1066c (Vernon 1984).
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lowances from the purchase price for the purpose of the sales tax,
with no equivalent provision for calculation of the use tax, is an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce." Similarly, a
state cannot exempt domestic goods from sales tax while subjecting similar goods imported for use within the state to taxation.7 8
So long as in "practical operation" the tax does not cause interstate commerce to bear more than its fair share of the cost of local
government whose benefits it enjoys, these schemes are within the
requirements of the Constitution.
C.

Collection by Out-of-State Vendors: Nexus

Since collection of use tax by the out-of-state vendor is an efficient administrative device, under what circumstances can a state
constitutionally require these sellers to collect its use tax? Generally, constitutional challenges to the state's right to require compliance have proceeded under the due process and commerce clauses.
The Supreme Court has held, however, that where a sufficient
"nexus" exists between the taxing state and the nonresident vendor, a requirement that the vendor collect the tax on purchases for
delivery in the taxing state does not violate any constitutional requirements. Consequently, the issue has become: What constitutes
sufficient nexus consistent with due process?
One of the turning point cases to consider this issue was General
Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, in which the Court held
that mere solicitation by traveling salesmen with order acceptance
and shipment by common carrier taking place outside the state,
was sufficient to invoke jurisdiction over every retailer maintaining
a place of business in the state. The argument that the Iowa Tax
Commissioner exceeded his authority by imposing the use tax on
purchases made in interstate commerce and in reaching beyond
the state's territorial borders to enforce it against a seller was
found by the Court to not diminish the protection afforded to the
seller's in-state activities.
In Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland,8 0 a Delaware furniture
77. See Matthews v. State of Colorado, Dept. of Revenue, 193 Colo. 44, 562 P.2d 415
(1977); Commonwealth v. Smith, 75 Dauph. Co. Rep. 23 (Pa. 1960). See also Memphis
Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
78. See, e.g., Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U.S. 375 (1939); Gray v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 379 P.2d 843 (Okla. 1963).
79. 322 U.S. 335 (1944). The Court recognized that "[tlo make the distributor the tax
collector for the State is a familiar and sanctioned device." Id. at 338.
80. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
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merchant who was neither qualified to do business nor employed
salesmen or agents in Maryland was required to collect taxes on
retail purchases for delivery in that state.81 The firm did not accept mail or telephone orders and advertised only in Delaware media which indirectly reached some Maryland residents.8 2 On these
facts, the Court was unable to find a nexus sufficient to meet the
due process requirement that there exist "some definite link, some
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or
.transaction it seeks to tax."83
Previously, the Court had sanctioned the collection of state use
tax by norresident vendors where the vendor was qualified to do
business in the state or derived substantial benefits by virtue of its
activities within the state." Miller Bros. appeared to lessen the requirements of due process in this area by requiring only minimum
contacts with the state imposing the duty to collect. One commentary observes, however, that this minimum contact requires the
physical presence of the nonresident vendor within the state, either through traveling salesmen, local agents, retail stores or independent brokers. 85 Whether this observation remains true in an increasingly technologically advanced society remains to be tested.
To date, however, the Court has refused to find a sufficient nexus
where a foreign merchant conducts a substantial business with residents of the taxing state exclusively through a mail-order house. 6
The "virtual welter of complicated obligations" that would result if
every political subdivision in the country were empowered to impose such a collection duty would nullify the purpose of the commerce clause to permit the free flow of trade between the states.8 7
Consequently, if a business is conducted exclusively through instrumentalities of interstate commerce, it is immune from the duty
to collect use taxes. However, if "the state has given anything for
which it can ask return" 8 the due process hurdles may be over81. Id. at 346-47.
82. Id. at 341.
83. Id. at 344-45.
84. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Indiana, 322 U.S. 340 (1944) Nelson v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941); Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359
(1941); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939); Monamotor Oil Co. v.
Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934).
85. See Springer & O'Byrne, Have States Overextended Their Rights to Collect Use
Tax from Out-of-State Sellers? 36 J. TAX'N 58, 58-59 (1972).
86. See National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
87. Id. at, 759-60.
88. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
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come. The question remains, however, whether the benefit bestowed must relate to the transaction or person sought to be
taxed."'
The most recent pronouncement in this questionable area is Na0
tional Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization."
National Geographic, a nonresident, nonprofit corporation maintained two offices in California for the sole purpose of soliciting
advertisement for its monthly magazine. From its District of Columbia headquarters, the company conducted a national mail-order business for the sale of its maps, atlases, globes and books. 9 '
National Geographic argued that it could not be obligated to collect use tax on its mail-order sales to California residents since due
process required not only a relationship between the seller and the
taxing state, but also between the activity of the seller sought to be
taxed and the seller's activity in the state. 92 In rejecting this argument, the Court stated that such "dissociation" does not bar the
imposition of the collection duty.e s Further, it was noted that:
The relevant constitutional test to establish the requisite nexus for requiring an out-of-state seller to collect and pay the use tax is not whether the
duty to collect the use tax relates to the seller's activities carried on within
the State, but simply whether the facts demonstrate 'some definite link,
some minimum connection, between [the State and] the person ... it seeks
14
to tax.'

Since the Court refused the "slightest presence" test under which
89. Two state courts considering this question have reached opposite results. Compare
Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Mahin, 44 Ill. 2d 354, 255 N.E.2d 458, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 919
(1970) (activities of subsidiary within taxing jurisdiction constitutionally sufficient to require absent parbnt to collect use tax on wholly unrelated sales) with Montgomery Ward v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 272 Cal. App. 2d 728, 78 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969), cert. denied, 396.
U.S. 1040 (1970) (no relationship between seller's general activities within the state and
sales beyond its borders to authorize it to collect use tax).
90. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
91. Id. at 552. California required every "retailer engaged in business in this state and
making sales of tangible personal property for storage, use or other consumption in this
state to collect from the purchaser a use tax in lieu of the sales tax imposed upon local
retailers." Id. at 553.
92. Id. at 560. As authority for its position, National Geographic relied on Nelson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941) and Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S.
373 (1941). 430 U.S. at 560-61.
93. 430 U.S. at 560.
94. Id. at 561 (quoting Miller Bros., 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)). Since the California
offices, without regard to the nature of the business conducted there, enjoyed fire and police
services as they would have if they assisted the mail-order business, due process was not
offended. 430 U.S. at 561.
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the California Supreme Court analyzed the problem, 9 5 it is yet unclear what constitutes this minimum connection.
Historically, the decisions seem to recognize the social, economic
and cultural development of our country and to react accordingly.
Early decisions strictly protected the interstate seller from any
duty to collect taxes. However, technological and other business
developments are such that the bases for earlier decisions have
eroded to the extent of permitting states to impose their requirements on interstate commerce. It is probable that some of this
change has been fostered by liberal jurists as well as the revenue
considerations of the taxing jurisdiction. It appears now that unless the state has absolutely no contacts with the nonresident vendor, it may impose a registration and collection duty on vendors
who are not engaged exclusively in interstate commerce.
II.

CONSTRUCTION OF SALES AND USE TAX STATUTES
A.

Governmental Immunity Exemption

The immunity of the federal government from taxation by states
includes, of course, exemption from sales tax on sales directly to
the United States government or its agencies.9 6 Questions arise,
however, as to purchases by contractors for use in performing contracts for the government, or an agency thereof, complicated by
contractual arrangements designed to make the contractor an
agent, or to pass title of materials used in the contract directly to
the government upon purchase. A particular problem arises in real
estate construction since the contractor is the consumer of the tangible personal property through his converting it into "real estate."
Another problem is that of the contractor using or possessing the
material, even though owned by the government, since many state
use taxes apply to mere possession or right to use, store or consume. The question of whether added cost to the government
would make the tax invalid seems to have been well-settled, since
such a tax is not a direct cost to the government anymore than are
increased social security taxes on a contractor's payroll, increased
freight rates, or payroll cost of living increases, most of which are
95. Id. at 556. To the Court, National Geographic's activities in California established
a substantial presence in that state. The two offices of the Society, plus the activities conducted there, sufficiently established a constitutional nexus. Id.
96. For an excellent discussion of the history and development of this immunity see
Rice & Estes, Sales and Use Taxes as Affected by Federal Governmental Immunity, 9
VAND. L. REV. 204 (1956).
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provided for under given contracts.
Contracts with the government are usually written in language
which purports to vest title to personal property in the government
upon purchase, thereby avoiding state sales or use taxes. Most of
these questioned contracts are cost-plus (i.e., fixed costs plus variable costs plus a percentage factor for profit, sometimes not to exceed a certain maximum). One of the earlier cases dealing with this
matter is that of Alabama v. King & Boozer,97 in which the contractor had a cost-plus contract with the United States to construct an army camp. Title to purchases of materials made by the
contractor for use in construction, was to pass to the government
upon delivery, inspection and acceptance of material by the government at the building site. The contractor would subsequently
be reimbursed for his cost (including taxes as applicable).9 The
state of Alabama contended that the sale was taxable because the
contractor was the purchaser and the real party in interest who
was paying for the material, only to be reimbursed by the government. 99 The contractor argued primarily that the legal incidence of
the tax fell upon the government, and that the latter was constitutionally exempt from state taxation. 100 In essence, the only real issue in the case was whether the government or the contractor was
the "purchaser" under Alabama state law, so as to be liable for the
tax. 1' 1 Mr. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the majority, indicated
that the mere circumstance that title to the lumber vested in the
government upon delivery was not sufficient to shift the legal incidence of the tax away from the contractor. 02 The legal effect of
the contract with the government was to oblige the contractor to
pay for the lumber. 03 The Court also indicated that simply because the economic burden of the tax passed to the government, it
was not thus unconstitutional.104 This decision set the stage for
disallowing mere assignability of a contract, or of reimbursement
subsequent to a contract's execution, as the sole basis for claiming
governmental immunity.
97.

314 U.S. 1 (1941).

98. Id. at 10.
99. Id. at 7-8. 1939 Ala. Acts 18, § II imposed the tax on the seller who is deemed the
"taxpayer," and § XXVI imposed the duty on the seller to collect the tax from the "purchaser." 314 U.S. at 7.
100. Id. at 9.
101. Id. at 9-10. See supra note 99.
102. 314 U.S. at 13-14.
103. Id. at 12.
104. Id. at 8,14.
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In Kern-Limerick v. Scurlock, 10 5 an Arkansas Gross Receipts
Tax (sales tax) imposed a two percent tax on all retail sales, collectible from the purchaser. 06 The contractor had a cost-plus
fixed-fee contract providing that he was to be the purchasing agent
for the United States, with title to such purchases passing directly
to the government; payment of the purchase price to the vendor
was then to be made by the government.10 7 The state assessed a
tax on the purchase of two tractors for use in constructing an ammunition dump for the United States Navy, arguing that the Navy
could not delegate its authority. The Supreme Court, however,
held that the imposition of such a tax was unconstitutional, since
the government was clearly disclosed as being the purchaser, and
that no liability of the purchasing agent to the seller was created
by the transaction. 0 8 King & Boozer was distinguished as an instance when the legal incidence of tax fell upon the contractor and
not upon the United States.'0 9
An ingenious approach to the definition of "use" appeared in the
government's argument in United States v. Boyd." 0 Under costplus contracts, several contractors agreed to provide managerial
and construction services for the Atomic Energy Commission at its
Oak Ridge, Tennessee facility. According to its terms, property for
the performance of the contract was to be purchased with government funds and title vested directly in the United States."' Tennessee taxed a contractor's use of property in the performance of
his contract, regardless of who owned the property. 1 2 The United
States opposed the exaction of these use taxes, claiming immunity.
Since it had previously been determined that a contractor's use of
property while engaging in business for profit was a taxable
event," 3 the government argued that the contractors in this situation were not engaged in commercial activity for profit, were paid
105.

347 U.S. 110 (1953).

106. Id. at 111.
107. Id. The statute indicated that gross receipts were exempt when derived from
sales to the United States government. Id. at 112.
108. Id. at 121.
109. Id. at 122.
110. 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
111. Id. at 41-43.
112. Id. at 40. This legislation followed the repeal of that section of the Atomic Energy
Act which exempted private companies from state tax on property used in fulfilling contracts with the Atomic Energy Commission. Id. The purpose of the repeal was to place AEC
contractors on the same footing with all other government contractors. Id. at 50.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Township of Muskigon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); Curry v.
United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941).
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for services only, did not stand to gain or lose by their efficient or
inefficient use, and had no investment or risk in the project.' 1 4 The
Court was unpersuaded by this reasoning and found that indeed
the contractors were using the property in connection with their
own commercial activities-the provision of services. ' 5 The tax
was held not to be directly imposed on the United States and thus
was valid, since the contractors had not become "instrumentalities" of the government."' In contrast, the sales tax was a direct
imposition on the government under the holding of KernLimerick.

117

A new dimension of use tax application was thus drawn by the
Court. The use of government-owned property by a federal contractor for his own profit or gain was determined to be a separate
taxable event, despite the fact that the tax is ultimately borne by
the United States. Further, it is immaterial whether the contract is
for the provision of services or the sale of a product. Apparently,
the Boyd case has been limited in its application to federal contractors only. Otherwise, it could be possible that use tax would be
assessed on personal property owned by anyone and merely serviced by an artisan or mechanic for a fee or profit.
The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed state taxation of government contractors, but in a different setting. In Knapp-Stiles, Inc.
v. Michigan Department of Revenue,"' Michigan asserted that use
tax was due from a contractor on his purchases of materials for use
in performing a federal government construction contract." 9 Michigan exempted such purchases for contracts with the state or its
political subdivisions, but did not grant an equivalent exemption
114. 378 U.S. at 44.
115. Id. at 45-46.
116. Id. at 48. Although the use taxes would increase the cost of the atomic energy
program, the Court noted that Congress was cognizant of this effect when repealing the
immunity. Id. at 49-50.
117. This determination was made by the Tennessee Supreme Court and left undisturbed by the Court on appeal. See id. at 43 & n.5.
118. 370 Mich. 629, 122 N.W.2d 642 (1963).
119. With respect to the application of the sales tax, Michigan also asserted that the
contractor was not exempt since its contractual relationship and building operations were
with a private corporation and not with the federal government or an agency thereof. Id at
632, 122 N.W.2d at 644. The contract required the contractor to form a Delaware corporation for the purpose of securing insurance and mortgage financing from the FHA, but upon
completion of the project all of the stock was to be delivered to the government. Id. at 631,
122 N.W.2d at 643. In piercing the corporate veil to get to the true substance of the arrangement, the court determined that the contract was with the federal government and sales
were thus exempt. Id. at 633, 122 N.W.2d 645.
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for federal construction contracts.'2 0 In declaring the taxing
scheme invalid, the court held "[that such distinction [was] arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory is evident."' "
B. Recent Interpretationsof Sales and Use Taxes
Most state tax statutes provide for sales tax application on any
transfer of title or possession of tangible personal property,1 22 and
use tax application on the storage, use or consumption of tangible
personal property. 2 3 Additionally, exemptions from state taxation
are also provided according to the state's particular taxing and social policies." ' However, determining the appropriate tax base for
application of the sales or use tax, or their exemptions, does not
easily follow from these definitions. A brief survey of some recent
decisions will serve to highlight some of the problems of statutory
25
interpretation in this area.1

1. Use, Storage and Consumption: Bullock v. Lone Star Gas Co.
Bullock v. Lone Star Gas Co.' 26 concerned the liability for use

taxes by a gas company which imported pipe from Europe for use
in intrastate sale and distribution of gas. While Texas contended
that state and local taxes were due on the sale, use and storage of
the pipe, 27 the taxpayer argued that no taxable events arose by
virtue of the use tax exemption for licensed and certificated carri120. Id. at 633, 122 N.W.2d at 645.
121. Id. at 636, 122 N.W.2d at 647. The court relied on the holding in Phillips Chem.
Co. v. Dumas Indep. School Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (1959). For a case holding that a distinction
between sales to charitable organizations and sales to the federal government is reasonable,
see United States v. Department of Revenue of Ill.,
202 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
122. See, e.g., 72 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 7201(k)(1), 7202 (Purdon 1983); OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 5739.02(A) (Page 1983).
123. See supra note 40.
124. See, e.g., 72 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. }§ 7204 (Purdon 1983), which exempts isolated
sales at retail or use of tangible personal property or services sold by a person who is not a
vendor with respect to such property or services; temporary storage not to exceed 7 days;
the sale at retail or use of coal, water, mail order catalogs and. direct mail advertising
literature.
125. For a more general discussion of these issues, see Ball, What is a Sale for Sales
Tax Purposes? 9 VAND. L. REV. 227 (1956); Hellerstein, The Scope of the Taxable Sale
under Sales and Use Tax Act: Sales as Distinguished from Services, 11 TAx L. REV. 261
(1956); Wahrhaftig, Meaning of Retail Sale and Storage, Use or Other Consumption, 8 LAw
& CONT. PROB. 543 (1941).
126. 567 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1978).
127. Id. at 496. Texas imposed a four percent tax on the receipts from the sale at
retail of all taxable items in the state. Id. An excise tax was imposed on the storage, use or
other consumption of taxable items purchased for storage, use or consumption. Id.
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ers of persons or property.'" In sustaining the tax, the Texas Supreme Court separated from the collective term "use tax" the elements of use, storage and consumption, each of which were deemed
unique privileges and thus separate taxable events.129 Consequently, it was concluded that the exemption of certificated and
licensed carriers from "use" did not carry over to the privilege of
storage. Since the statute only exempted use by licensed or certificated carriers, the company was liable for storage tax because the
pipe had been stored for the period of time when it had reached
the end of its international transportation but prior to its exempt
0
use."
This interpretation by the Texas Supreme Court is wholly distinguishable from those cases it relied on which determined when
an item in interstate commerce is subject to the state's jurisdiction
for tax purposes. "' Under these holdings, it was determined that
the use of property in interstate commerce could not be taxed.
More importantly, the use in these decisions was not excluded on
legislative policy grounds, but on constitutional grounds.' 32 In order that the state might tax these transactions, the privilege of use
was separated from the privilege of storage or withdrawal. In Lone
Star, however, the Texas legislature had determined, as a matter
of state policy, to exclude from the use tax, defined as use, storage
or consumption,'3 3 use by a licensed and certificated carrier.
Therefore, it was the legislature's judgement that purchases in interstate commerce should not share equally in the tax burden with
local purchases in this specific instance. 3 4 This policy would appear to be tortured by the decision of the Texas Supreme Court
128. Art. 20.02(G)(3)(a) of the Limited Sales, Excise and Use Tax Act exempted from
use tax tangible personal property acquired outside of the state and used as a licensed and
certificated carrier of persons or property. 567 S.W.2d at 496. See Tax. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN.
art. 20.02(G)(3)(a) (Vernon 1969).
129. 567 S.W.2d at 497. The court noted that when the Texas legislature intended to
exempt all of the activities, it specifically provided for use, storage and consumption. Id.
130. Id. at 497. The court relied on Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167
(1939) for the proposition that a tax on storage could be validly imposed on that "taxable
moment" when goods purchased in interstate commerce had reached the end of their interstate journey and had not yet begun to be used in interstate operation. See 306 U.S. at 177.
131. In addition to Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939) the court
relied on American Airlines Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 216 Cal. App. 2d 180, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 590 (1963); Northern Natural Gas. Co. v. Lauterbach, 251 Iowa 885, 100 N.W.2d 908
(1960); and Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939).
132. See, e.g., Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929), supra notes 35-38
and accompanying text.
133. See 567 S.W.2d at 496.
134. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
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that the storage of articles prior to their exempt use is not concomitantly exempt. Perhaps the court was annoyed by the company's
assertion that to hold this transaction taxable would make "nullities" of the exemption sections.138 In any event, the effect of the
decision was to interpret the preparatory step toward exempt use
as a purchase for storage. If carried to its infinite possibilities, such
an interpretation would certainly reduce the exemption to insignificance. If the pipe laid for several days beside the ditch before being put into the ground, under the Lone Star decision this could be
considered storage subject to tax.
2.

Computer Software: What Constitutes Tangible Property

As a result of the development of modern technology and the
rapid expansion of the computer industry, an interesting issue in
state taxation arises with respect to the sale and use of computer
software and printouts. Since most states do not generally tax personal services, intangible personal property or materials directly
used in manufacturing, the question becomes whether computer
software and printouts are included within these exemptions. Because of the significant revenues to the state that would result
from the recognition of computer related products as taxable
items, a growing number of state statutes or regulations provide
that software is tangible personal property subject to tax.' s Where
courts have considered the issue, however, the majority have concluded that the software is an intangible item exempt from taxation. 13 7 The difficulty in resolving these conflicting interpretations
was specifically acknowledged by one court.
Computer services, particularly software and information services, are different from other property rights. It is not sensible to apply concepts such
135. See 567 S.W.2d at 497.
136. See, e.g., 61 PA. CODE § 31.32(d) (1983) which provides that "[t]he sale or lease of
applied or operating programs [software] is a sale at retail. . . ." See also TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 67-6-102(B) (Michie 1983) providing that "[s]ale shall also mean such transfer of customized or packaged computer software .... For such purpose, computer software shall be considered tangible personal property .... For a recent review of the various state sales and
use taxes on computer software, see Note, Sales and Use Tax of Computer Software-Is
Software Tangible Personal Property? 27 WAYNE L. REv. 1503, 1531-36 (1981).
137. See, e.g., James v. Tres Computer Systems, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. 1982); First
National Bank of Springfield v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 85 111.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d
175 (1981); Spencer Gifts, Inc., v. Director, Division of Taxation, 182 N.J. Super. 179, 440
A.2d 104 (1981); Janesville Data Center, Inc., v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Revenue, 84 Wis. 341,
267 N.W.2d 656 (1978); Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977);
Alabama v. Central Computer Services, Inc., 349 So. 2d 1160 (Ala. 1977); District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates, Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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as tangible and intangible, applicable to a very different world, to the computer world. Even the distinction between property and services is not helpful here where definitions appropriate to the subject matter of the tax are
needed. Significant tax burdens should not be predicated on largely irrelevant concepts developed in different times for different purposes.""

Initially, courts which struggled with the application of traditional legal principles to the technologies of the computer justified
the abatement of the tax on computer software imposed by the
state on several grounds. Typical of these cases is Commerce
Union Bank v. Tidwell,"' which found the transfer of magnetic
tapes and punch cards to be "merely incidental to the purchase of
14 0
the intangible knowledge and information stored on the tapes."
In support of its conclusion that the object of the purchase was
intangible knowledge and not tangible personal property, the court
highlighted several factors unique to this transaction. First, it was
noted that alternative methods were available for accomplishing
the same transfer of knowledge without the assistance of tangible
media such as tapes and cards. For example, the same information
could be transferred to the user by telephone transmission or via
direct programming into the user's computer by.the program originator."' Second, the court was persuaded by the fact that once the
information was transferred, the tapes and cards lost their value to
14 2
the user and were either destroyed or returned to the seller.
What actually remained was the intangible knowledge. The enormously enhanced value of the tapes and cards once the information has been coded thereon also appeared to be a significant factor in the court's analysis.1 43 Finally, the court distinguished the
138. Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 182 N.J. Super, 179, 209, 440
A.2d 104, 120 (1981).
139. 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976). Tennessee imposed a sales or use tax on "every
person... who engages in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail ...or
who uses or consumes ... any item or article of tangible personal property ...." Id. at
406. Tangible personal property was statutorily defined as "personal property, which may be
seen, weighed, measured, felt, or touched, or is in any other manner perceptible to the
senses." Id.
140. Id. at 408. The court relied in part on the decision in Washington Times-Herald,
Inc. v. District of Columbia, 213 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (abating tax on sale of newspaper
mats containing cartoons since newspaper was purchasing the right to reproduce cartoons
and not the mats).
141. 538 S.W.2d at 408.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 407. The court noted that the cost of punch cards was approximately $1.30
per thousand and about 4,000 to 6,000 cards were required for a program. Further, costs for
the magnetic tapes were approximately $11.00 per reel. However, the taxpayer's cost for the
programs ranged from $700 to $60,000.
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analogy of this transaction to the sale of phonograph records and
motion picture films declared to be taxable. Since "without the
film there could be no movie" and the purchaser of a phonograph
record has no other viable way of "bringing the music. . . into his
living room," these crucial differences justified the distinction.' "
Further, the court noted that records and films do not lose their
value to the user after use and are complete and ready for use at
the time of purchase.'4 5 In response to this decision, the Tennessee
legislature rejected the notion that software was an intangible and
specifically provided for its taxability. 14 Despite the fact that this
case is now moot, a variety of other courts continue to rely on the
reasoning employed to justify their holdings that software is not
taxable as an item of tangible personal property.
This analysis' has also been extended to transactions involving
the lease of computer information. In Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Direc47
tor, Division of Taxation,1
the taxpayer's lease of computer
software containing mailing list information was held not to be
taxable since the tapes were only an inconsequential element of
48
the transaction whose real object was obtaining information.
Noting that the form of delivery of information should not control
its taxability, 14 9 the New Jersey Tax Court relied on those factors
highlighted in the Tidwell decision.150
Spencer Gifts is even more significant in that it also involved
the interpretation and application of a state regulation which
taxed the sale of computer prepared mailing lists.' 5 ' The court
found no statutory basis for the ruling if it was intended to tax the
transfer of tangible personal property as an inconsequential element of a personal service transaction."5 ' Additionally, to the ex144. Id. at 407-08. The court acknowledged that the sound emanating from the record
was the object of the purchase; however, no other alternative method existed to accomplish
the same purpose.
145. Id. at 408. The court's basis for distinguishing this aspect of software was that the
information on the tape must be translated into the computer's language before it can be
used.
146. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-102(B)(Michie 1983), reproduced in pertinent part,
supra note 136.
147. 182 N.J. Super. 179, 440 A.2d 104 (1981).
148. Id. at 204, 440 A.2d at 118. To the court, the tangible personal property which
transmitted the information was incidental to the underlying transaction between the
parties.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text.
151. 182 N.J. Super. at 205, 440 A.2d at 118.
152. Id. at 206, 440 A.2d at 118.
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tent the regulation taxed mailing list data on computer tapes, the
court found the regulation to be beyond the scope of the sales tax
act and therefore invalid. " 3 However, the question was left open as
to whether computer printed mailing lists could be validly taxed
under the statute or the regulation.
Whether computer programs are unique to fit the specialized
needs of the individual user or are standard programs did not appear to be a significant factor in those early cases deciding whether
the transaction involved tangible personal property. In First National Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock,ss the fact that the taxpayer
had purchased standardized or "canned" programs did not prevent
the court from declaring software to be an intangible item exempt
from taxation. The First National Bank court employed all of the
same rationales of the Tidwell court in reaching its conclusion, emphasizing the loss of value of the tapes after use and the availability of alternative methods of transfer. Accordingly, the test of
these transactions was whether the object of the sale was tangible
personal property.'' More recently, however, the distinction between customized and canned programs appears to be growing in
significance. Those states which tax computer software often exempt customized software from taxation."16 A recent Michigan
court explained, "[c]ustomized computer software programs should
be distinguished from canned software programs, e.g., TV games,
albums, and cassette tapes, because the latter are all end products
7
in themselves.""11
The most recent decision to consider this issue, Comptroller of
the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co.,"" not only held canned programs to be taxable but also rejected all of the prior arguments
supporting the conclusion that all software is intangible personal
property. In Equitable Trust, the taxpayer, through license agree153. Id., 440 A.2d at 118. It was not clear to the court whether the regulation covered
sales and leases of tapes with mailing list information or merely taxed tangible mailing lists
produced by the computer.
154. 584 S.W.2d 548 (1979). The four programs totalling approximately $109,000.00
enabled the taxpayer to perform deposit and lending function and to process general
accounting.
155. 584 S.W.2d at 550. The court rejected that state's argument that the personal
service characteristic was present only in the case of customized programs.
156. See Note, supra note 136 at 1531-36, indicating that of the 34 states taxing
software, only 10 taxed canned software exclusively.

157. Maccabees Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Michigan Dep't. of Treasury, Revenue Division, 122 Mich. App. 660, 332 N.W.2d 561, 564 (1983). The issue of tangibility in this case
was decided on a motion for summary judgment.
158. 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983).
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ments, acquired the right to use several prepackaged, canned programs in its business.15 9 While Maryland argued that the acquisition of the tapes constituted a sale, the taxpayer argued that the
essence of the transaction was the acquisition of intangible personal property-knowledge. 1 60 In refusing to "conceptually sever"
the information on the tape from the tangible medium itself to
hold the transaction exempt, the court declined to adopt as part of
the state's sales tax law "a principle that the buyer's predominant
purpose for a transaction controls the classification . . . as either
'1 61
tangible or intangible."
The basis for the decision was primarily twofold. First, the sales
tax statute itself evidenced a legislative intent to include computer
software as a taxable item. Since by statutory definition "price"
included the "value in money. . of a retail sale without deduction. . . on account of the cost of the property sold, cost of materials used, labor or service cost, or any other expense whatsoever,"16 2 to sever the insignificant blank tape from the valuable
program copy would be contrary to legislative policy. 16 Moreover,

since the legislature had specifically exempted cartoon mats,16 4 and
the lease of motion picture films by persons subject to amusement
tax, it was obvious to the court that absent such exemptions, the
artistic content or the right to exhibit the film would not be severed from its tangible medium.1 5 Such an inference was further
159. Id. at 461-62, 464 A.2d at 249.
160. Id. at 466, 464 A.2d at 251-52. In an amicus brief, the Data Processing Management Association argued that what was acquired in the transaction was a license to use the
program and that such a right was intangible property. Id., 464 A.2d at 251. However, the
court quickly rejected this argument since a patent or copyright was not involved. Rather,
the "licenses simply erect[ed] contractual limitations on the use which Equitable might otherwise make of the statutorily unprotected program copies it acquired...." Id. at 467-68,
464 A.2d at 252.
161. Id. at 468, 464 A.2d at 253. The court noted that the taxpayer's dominant purpose in the transaction was to obtain a copy of the programs. Id. at 470, 464 A.2d at 254.
162. Id., 464 A.2d at 253.
163. Id. Tidwell and other decisions recognized the insignificant value of the blank
tapes as an element in determining the real object of the purchase. See supra note 143.
164. In identifying this particular exemption, the court was attempting to establish
the inconsistencies of Maryland sales tax law with the decisions in District of Columbia v.
Universal Computer Associates, Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972) and Washington TimesHerald v. District of Columbia, 213 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1954). In contrast to these decisions,
enactment of the exemption indicated the legislative recognition that the purchase of cartoon mats was a taxable event. 296 Md. at 481, 464 A.2d at 259.
165. Id., 464 A.2d at 259. As additional support for this conclusion, the court interpreted its own dicta in Greyhound Computer v. Maryland, 271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974)
to permit taxation of computer software, although courts in most other jurisdictions had
construed Greyhound to reach an opposite result. See 296 Md. at 481 n.10, 464 A.2d at 259
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supported by the fact that Maryland's sales tax statute had never
conceptually severed the copy of the artistic performance from the
phonograph record, and there appeared no legally significant difference between canned software and the record to justify severance in this instance. 6 '
The second basis for the court's decision was its rejection of the
"technological underpinnings" of the prior cases declaring software
to be intangible. While several courts found that what actually remained in the computer after the tapes and cards were destroyed
or returned to the seller was knowledge, 16 7 the Equitable Trust
court reasoned that "[wihat rests in the programmed memory is
not 'knowledge'.. . but machine instructions." ' " Under this analysis, taxability of software should not turn on whether the program
is stored in memory nor on the capacity of the user's computer to
store the information.'60 Likewise, the court also rejected the alternative' methods approach which recognized that a computer may
be programmed without the use of tangible media. 170 Although a
taxable transaction might be structured in a nontaxable form, this
approach does not take into account the actual facts of the transaction nor control its taxability.' 7 ' With respect to the prior reasoning which recognized as a significant fact the loss of value after
use and the return of the tape to the seller or destruction of the
program after entry into the buyer's machine, the Equitable Trust
court flatly stated that "intangibility should not be determined by
1' 7 2
the extent of use.
n.10. The Equitable Trust court read Greyhound's suggestion of a distinction in property
tax valuation between operational and applicational software as enabling the conclusion
that both were taxable for sales tax purposes. See id. at 481-83, 464 A.2d at 259-61.
166. Id. at 484-85, 464 A.2d at 261. The court acknowledged, however, that a different
result might be reached if the information was transferred directly to the user's computer by
keyboard input or through electronic transmissions. Id. at 484, 464 A.2d at 261.
167. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates, 465 F.2d 615,
618 (1972)("[wlhat rests in the machine, then, is an intangible-'knowledge'-which can
hardly be subject to a personal property tax."); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538
S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tenn. 1976) ("what actually remains in the computer is intangible knowledge; this is what was purchased, not... tapes or the punch cards.").
168. 296 Md. at 472, 464 A.2d at 255.
169. Id. Accordingly, a tax system cannot be administered on whether the purchaser
intends to store the program continuously in memory. Id.
170. Id. at 473, 464 A.2d at 255. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
171. 296 Md. at 473. 464 A.2d at 255. Subsequently, however, the court did note that a
different result might be reached if tangible media were not used in the transaction. See
supra note 166 and accompanying text.
172. 296 Md. at 473, 464 A.2d at 255. In this case, the court noted, the taxpayer retained possession of the tapes after use.
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Indeed, Equitable Trust provides several strong arguments for
the taxability of canned computer programs. Under its analysis,
however, customized programs would appear to be nontaxable by
virtue of the personal services exemption. What is unsettling about
this opinion is the court's expansive reading of the sales tax statute. If a taxing statute is to be strictly construed against the taxing
1
authority and any ambiguities resolved in favor of the taxpayer, 7
it is difficult to understand how the Equitable Trust court determined that canned software was intended by the legislature to be
included as a taxable item. At a minimum, the cases analyzed
above reflect a sharp distinction among the courts and legislatures
as to whether software is tangible or intangible. Much of this problem has resulted from statutes which are less than clear on this
issue as well as the application of traditional legal principles to untraditional modern technology. Such policy determinations as to
those articles to be granted an exemption and those to be taxed are
perhaps more appropriate for legislative bodies.
Further, the court's basis for the distinction between software
and knowledge is unclear at best. Simply by changing terms, the
court transforms intangible "knowledge" into "machine instructions." The opinion, however, does not take that further step to
explain how machine instructions transform the information conveyed into a tangible, taxable item. Such an undeveloped analysis
is not unique to this case however. As one commentator has noted,
the focus by reviewing courts on the tangible aspects of software
rather than on its intrinsic nature-knowledge-has resulted in
the application of sales and use tax according to the significance of
174
the tangible aspects of the medium to the transaction.
The relevance of the tangible aspects of the software transaction
to the sales and use tax applicability is no more apparent than in
those cases where the transaction involves computer printouts as a
consequence of the sale or use. The determination of liability for
sales and use tax on computer printouts generally has turned on
whether the printout is merely an element of a personal service
transaction by the data processor or whether the printout was the
real object sought by the customer. Thus, in Citizens Financial
Corp. v. Kosydar,17 8 the supreme court of Ohio focused on the essence of the transaction between the data processing company and
173. See First National Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548, 555 (Tex.
1979). See also J. HELLERSTRIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 3, at 38-42.
174.
175.

See Note, supra note 136, at 1519.
43 Ohio St.2d 148, 331 N.E.2d 435 (1975).
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its savings and loan association customers to conclude that the real
object sought by the customer was the use of the computer system
to produce a journal of its savings and loan transactions. Since the
data processor was neither consulted for analysis or problem solving, nor did it advise the savings and loan associations "what direction [they] should take in formulating their approach to the business world," a personal service transaction was not created
17
between the taxpayer and his clients.

Copsequently, something more than sorting, classifying and
printing the raw data supplied by the customer is necessary to create a personal service transaction in order to exempt the computer
printout from sales and use tax. If the written materials constitute
more than an inconsequential element of the data processing services, the taxpayer-seller may be liable for sales tax.1 7 Rather, the
taxpayer must engage in some analysis of the data and perhaps
assist in management decisions. Accordingly, some type of customized software appears to be indicated in these transactions. Precisely what degree of analysis the taxpayer must engage in is not
clear from these decisions.
3. Manufacturer's Own-Use Tax Base
Since most states impose a sales or use tax on tangible personal
property purchased at retail, such legislation permits a manufacturer, using his own manufactured product for a taxable purpose,
the unique position of adopting as his tax base the price of the raw
materials consumed in the manufacture of the article. Since withdrawals from inventory cannot be considered a sale at retail, such
activity by the manufacturer-taxpayer eliminates from his tax base
for sales and use tax purposes the costs of labor, overhead, transportation and other costs normally included in the retail price to
the purchaser. Examples would include a business machines manufacturer using its own products in its offices, or the contracting division of a steel manufacturer using its own steel in the construction of buildings and bridges. Not only does this "self-produced"
exception permit the taxpayer to reduce his sales and use tax lia176. Id. at 150, 331 N.E.2d at 437.
177. See, e.g., Statistical Tabulating Corp. v. Lindley, 3 Ohio St.3d 23, 445 N.E.2d
1104 (1983). In this case, the data processor provided programming services to small and
medium sized businesses including payroll, accounts receivable, general ledger, inventory
and billing. The court determined that the sales were taxable since the real object of the
transaction was the receipt of written reports, documents and payroll checks. Id. at 24, 445
N.E.2d at 1106.
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bility, it allows him a competitive advantage in the marketplace as
well, since he is able to pass his tax savings along to his customers.
Among the few cases considering this issue is InternationalBusiness Machines Corp. v. Charnes.7 s In IBM, the manufacturer
withdrew from its sales inventory several business machine products for its own use, paying a use tax calculated on the cost of the
raw materials and component parts of the machines only. 179 Since
the Colorado sales and use statute exempted purchases of property
for resale and items used directly in manufacturing from the payment of tax, IBM's original purchase of the component parts for
the machines was a nontaxable event. 8 0 Colorado, however, assessed use tax against the business machines calculated on the full
value of the finished goods on the grounds that since the purchase
was originally exempt, the transaction could not be later
recharacterized in order to avoid tax liability. 8 ' Further, the state
argued that the withdrawal of the items from inventory triggered
the use tax. The supreme court of Colorado disagreed and permitted the subsequent recharacterization of the transaction, the value
for tax purposes to be calculated at the time of the original
purchase. 1 82 Withdrawal from inventory for intracompany use was
not deemed analogous to the two-party sale since one cannot sell
to himself. 83
Thus, transfers between departments or divisions are not sales
within the definition of the statute. It should be noted, however,
that this exception does not apply to transfers between parent and
subsidiary corporations. Such transaction are considered sales between separate companies, despite the fact that the subsidiary may
be wholly owned by the parent. 1'
178.

198 Colo 374, 601 P.2d 622 (1979).

179. Id. at 376, 601 P.2d at 623-24. IBM did not factor in its own labor and overhead
costs into the tax base, thus using the same tax base for each item as would have applied if
the original purchase of that item's component parts had not been exempt from sales tax.
Id., 601 P.2d at 624.
180. Id., 601 P.2d at 623-24.
181. Id. at 378, 601 P.2d at 625. The state was concerned that a purchaser might evade

both sales and use taxes by purchasing an item at wholesale and then converting the item to
its own use. In fact, under its regulation, tangible personal property, purchased tax free for
resale or as an ingredient of a manufactured product, which was subsequently withdrawn
from stock was to be taxed at the full finished goods cost. Id. at 375, n.1, 601 P.2d at 623
n.1.
182. Id. at 379, 601 P.2d at 625-26.
183. Id., 601 P.2d at 625.
184. See, e.g., Superior Coal Co. v. Department of Finance, 377 IM.282, 36 N.E.2d 354
(1941) (sales of coal by wholly owned subsidiary to the parent taxable at retail). See generaliy Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 769 (1959).
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CONCLUSION

The distinction between sales tax and use tax is apparent from
the historical development presented herein. The use tax is paramount in several states, imposed and due from the purchaser unless the tax has been satisfied by payment to the vendor of the
sales tax (or use tax if an out-of-state vendor). 8 5
Use tax statutes generally include by definition three facets of
"use"-storage, use or consumption. It seems absolutely paradoxical to equivocate this language by fragmentation into three separate and distinct propositions of law as done by the Texas court in
Lone Star Gas Co.'86 Certainly any purchase for "use" incurs at
least a moment of "storage" prior to use. Therefore, if the enigma
of the Texas decision were proliferated it would render most statutory use tax exemptions of nugatory effect. If such fatuous philosophy is perpetrated again by any taxing authority, it must be relitigated to restore symmetry in use tax concepts.
Sales and use tax collection requirements for out-of-state vendors have been the subject of several law review articles or comments in earlier years when sales taxes were in infancy.187 These
articles were generally discourses on the legal ramifications and potentials of arguments as to the interstate aspects of subjugating
interstate sellers to the status of state tax collectors. With these
issues fairly decided, the questions now center around what activities by the nonresident seller will allow the taxing authority to require the collection of its use tax in the transaction. Of course,
whether the transaction is sales or use tax depends upon the activity of the seller in the state concerned, but the court decisions
clearly indicate the trend that any minimal "connection" appears
to suffice for the granting of jurisdiction, whichever statute
applies. 88
In our continually changing trade economy and advancements in
185. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 439.3 (Smith-Hurd 1974); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5741.02(B) (Page 1983); 72 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7202(b) (Purdon 1983).
186. See supra notes 126-35 and accompanying text.
187. See generally Comment, Compensating Use Taxes: Past and Present Constitutional Problems in Imposition and Collection, 18 ARK. L. REv. 322 (1965); Powell, Sales
and Use Taxes: Collection From Absentee Vendors, 57 HAzv. L. Rav. 1086 (1944); Warren
and Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays Its Way, 38 COLUM. L.
Rzv. 49 (1938).
188. Another very essential factor is the general rule that for sales claimed to be exempt from tax, a valid exemption certificate executed by the purchaser must be timely received by the seller to be effective. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.02(3)(a) (West 1984); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 120, §441c (Smith-Hurd 1974); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5730.03 (Page 1983).
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technological goods such as computer software and services, the
area of sales and use tax law is very viable. This, plus the constant
need of state and local taxing jurisdictions for increased revenue,
promises more litigation in present and future years.

